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this paper investigates the Jerusalem 
master Plan with reference to the israeli-
Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem. 
the Jerusalem master Plan is the first 
comprehensive plan for the “whole” city 
(both the western and the eastern parts): for 
the first time, the comprehensive spatial 
vision of Jerusalem in the twenty-first 
century that the israeli authorities aim to 
realize is clearly expressed. in particular, the 
paper focuses on the theme of housing: it 
analyses in detail the contents of the master 
plan, showing the different treatment of the 
arab and Jewish populations, and it reflects 
on the chances the different aspects of the 
plan have of being implemented. it is argued 
that the master plan is an integral part of a 
forty-year israeli urban strategy concerning 
Jerusalem, aimed at encouraging Jewish 
residential settlement in the eastern part of 
the city (even if it presents some elements 
of discontinuity that are worth underlining).
Introduction
Planning the Occupation
it is rather banal to state that space is 
both political and strategic and that, as a 
consequence, the design and organization 
of space is a political and strategic activity.1 
notwithstanding that, planning is often 
considered an almost depoliticized activity 
or, at least, a progressive practice, ignoring 
“the position of planning as an arm of the 
modern nation-state … [and overlooking] 
the numerous instances in which planning 
functions as a form of deliberate social 
control and oppression exercised by elites 
over weaker groups.”2 But we only need 
to look at the urban contexts of tough 
social conflicts (for instance, at what Scott 
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Bollens defines as “polarized” or “divided cities”3) for planning to disclose all its non-
neutrality. 
this is precisely the case with Jerusalem, where planning is one of the privileged 
tools of a “low intensity war,”4 which combines the “dramatic violence of some 
events, really easy to be remembered because of the mass media interest (bombs, 
killings, missiles and bulldozers) … with slower and more consequential events (the 
construction of buildings, streets, tunnels) no less violent or destructive.”5 the israeli-
Palestinian conflict becomes, within the holy City, “a war of cement and stone.”6 the 
reason is quite clear: anyone who can physically dominate Jerusalem can decide the 
destiny of the city.7 to this end, the design and organization of space play a key role, 
and planning is the tool for achieving specific political aims.
the role of urban policies in the israeli-Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem has 
been well analysed by many scholars. however, the Jerusalem master Plan has not 
yet been analysed with reference to the conflict. the aim of this paper is to present 
such an analysis. the Jerusalem master Plan is actually a very significant document: 
it is the first comprehensive plan for the “whole” city (both West and East Jerusalem) 
since israel occupied the Eastern part of the city in 1967. For the first time, the 
comprehensive and detailed spatial vision of Jerusalem in the twenty-first century that 
the israeli authorities aim to realize is clearly expressed in an official document. 
The Ultimate Aim of Israeli Urban Policies in Jerusalem
as is well known, israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967 during the Six-day War 
and in 1980 declared the whole city, both the western part and the eastern occupied 
part, to be the “eternal and united” capital of the Jewish State. nonetheless, the 
international community has never recognized israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem,8 
and Palestinians still claim East Jerusalem as the capital of their future state. this is 
the reason why the main israeli effort since the 1967 annexation has been to strengthen 
de facto its control over the whole city; the aim being to create “urban facts” which 
would make any future division of the city practically impossible. as michael 
romann and alex Weingrod state, “the overall [israeli] policy had as its main axiom 
the prevention of any possible future attempts to again divide the city or to cut off the 
occupied East Jerusalem territory from sovereign israeli control.”9 
according to oren Yiftachel,10 this purpose is reflected in the enactment of a 
parallel process of both “Judaization” (i.e. encouragement of Jewish settlements, in 
particular in the eastern part of the city) and “de-arabization” (i.e. containment of 
arab urban expansion). 
to get an idea of the “Judaization” process it is sufficient to note that since 1967 
the israeli government has expropriated Palestinian land comprising approximately 
35 percent of East Jerusalem’s surface territory (about 24.5 km²), mainly to build 
Jewish residential neighborhoods.11 here almost 51,000 Jewish houses have been 
built, the majority of these constituting public housing12 built by the israeli authorities 
(or with their support), and are dedicated exclusively for the Jewish population.13 in 
2008 approximately 195,000 Jews lived in East Jerusalem (more than 38.9 percent of 
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the Jewish Jerusalemites).14 Planning (together with urban policies) is a tool through 
which Judaization  has been implemented.15
at the same time, through planning, the israeli authorities have also pursued the 
“de-arabization” of the city, i.e. the containment of both urban and demographic 
expansion of the arab population. more precisely, the urban containment has been 
carried out both as an end in itself, to leave territory free for Jewish settlements, 
and as a means to effect arab demographic containment. in fact, one of the main 
problems israel has had to face since the East Jerusalem annexation in 1967 has been 
arab demographic growth being greater than Jewish demographic growth. despite 
the israeli authorities’ blunt intentions to keep the “balance 70-30” (i.e. 70 percent 
Jews, 30 percent arabs) and all the attempts made in this direction, the demographic 
balance has continued to shift in favor of the arab population. in 1967 the whole 
city of Jerusalem hosted about 266,300 inhabitants, 74 percent of them Jewish16 and 
25.8 percent arab; in 2011 the city’s population reached 789,000 inhabitants, 63.9 
percent Jewish and 36.1 percent arab.17 according to projections for Jerusalem in the 
year 2020 the city’s total population might grow to 958,000 inhabitants, 61.2 percent 
Jewish (587,200) and 38.8 percent arab (371,100).18 as Eyal Weizman states, “the 
policy of maintaining ‘demographic balance’ has informed the underlying logic of 
almost every master plan prepared for the city’s development.”19 
The Jerusalem Master Plan20
during his second tenure as mayor of Jerusalem, Ehud olmert began work on 
designing a local outline scheme for Jerusalem,21 the so-called “Jerusalem master 
Plan 2000.” the last outline plan for the city in fact dated back to 1959 (local Plan 
no. 62).22 not even after the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 did the israeli 
authorities provide the city with a comprehensive plan, excepting one abortive 
attempt in the 1970s. the need to give a city like Jerusalem, experiencing such great 
expansion, an up-to-date and comprehensive plan became increasingly more pressing 
until, in 2000, olmert launched the Jerusalem master Plan project. 
After some years of work, the first version of the master plan, known as Report 
No. 4, was officially presented in September 2004 by Uri Lupolianski, the Jerusalem 
mayor who succeeded olmert. the plan was approved by the local planning 
committee only in april 2007, and it continued to be discussed by the district planning 
committee until may 2008. however, in november 2008 nir Barkat was elected 
mayor of Jerusalem, and immediately asked to delay the plan’s ratification. In May 
2009, Barkat submitted to the district planning committee his requests for changes to 
the plan.23
the situation was further complicated by the intervention, in June 2009, of Eliyahu 
Yishai,24 the new minister of the interior. Yishai asked that the plan be returned to the 
local commission for deliberation because, in his opinion, the changes introduced by 
the district commission were too favorable to the arab Jerusalemites.25 in the autumn 
[ 8 ]  The Jerusalem Master Plan: Planning into the Conflict
of 2010 a revised version of the plan was submitted for public reaction.26 
To date the plan has still not received final approval. Nonetheless, even without 
that approval, the plan is the frame of reference for current planning decisions in 
Jerusalem. as mayor nir Barkat states: “the master plan has been publicly discussed 
for five years in the local and district planning committees, and now practically 
everyone is working according to this plan, although it is not yet official.”27  
A Political Plan
like other comparable planning documents, the Jerusalem master Plan deals with 
different fields, including archaeology, tourism, economy, education, transport, 
the environment and others, while pursuing different goals. the Jerusalem master 
Plan represents the overall vision which the israeli municipality, according to the 
israeli Government, aims to realize.28 Because of the importance of the city’s spatial 
configuration relative to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the master plan is not simply 
the result of technical urban planning based on technical considerations, but also, and 
above all else, it is the expression of a specific political project. 
the fact that a spatial plan also has a political dimension is not surprising. as horst 
W. J. rittel and melvin Webber maintain, “Planning is a component of politics. there 
is no escaping that truism.”29 this is true everywhere;30 in a context of tough ethnic 
and social conflict it naturally becomes more evident. This is the case with Jerusalem. 
here, as i shall argue, the technical contents of the plan do not only have a deep 
political sense, but they also act as a sort of “veil of maya” disguising the real political 
aims pursued by the design of space. When this veil is lifted, the plan reveals the real 
intention of the politics. the master plan becomes incontrovertible physical evidence 
of israel’s long-term political projects. 31  
The Housing Theme
the Jerusalem master Plan is a complex document, largely because its two different 
sets of goals, the political and the technical, are intertwined. to go deeply into its 
content an operation of dissection is useful to distinguish “general” statements from 
the more “substantive” ones.
all these statements have both political and a technical dimensions. however, 
the “general” statements are mainly rhetorical, sometimes operating as a veil 
masking the substantive contents of the plan. in contrast, “substantive” statements 
may properly be considered as the technical contents of the plan, relating to spatial 
design; they enable us to discern the specific urban transformations related to 
the master plan and, in consequence, isolate the “facts on the ground” the israeli 
authorities aim to create. 
to fully comprehend the spatial transformations related to the plan, it is important 
also to compare the plan’s substantive contents to the current urban context and the 
other urban policies to which the plan’s implementation is related. in this way it is 
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possible to discover which provisions of the plan are really achievable and, conversely, 
which provisions appear to be non-achievable. 
General Statements
reading the master plan at the level of general statements gives the impression that 
it assiduously seeks to present itself as a technical document attempting to resolve 
all Jerusalem’s urban problems in a neutral way, without any discrimination, and 
regardless of political issues connected with city governance. 
For instance, the plan never refers to the occupied status of East Jerusalem, never 
addresses the criticism of the building of new houses in Jewish neighborhoods in 
East Jerusalem,32 and does not acknowledge the tensions and conflicts between Arabs 
and Jews in some areas of the city like the so-called holy Basin, or Silwan. all the 
contents of the plan are presented as if they were situated in a neutral, non-problematic 
and apolitical space. 
at the same time, the plan professes a desire to treat both the Jewish and the arab 
populations in the same way. For instance, the very first lines of Report No. 4 claim 
that one of the main purposes of the plan is to ensure “an urban quality of life for all 
the residents [emphasis added]”33 and “to preserve the special character of the city as 
a world city, sacred to the three major monotheistic religions of the world, and at the 
same time to create a living and vibrant city providing its citizens with a high level 
and quality of life.”34 
overview of Silwan from the City of david archaeological site. Source: photo by Davide Locatelli (2010)
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at the level of general statements, the Jerusalem master Plan seems to break away, 
at least partially, from the discriminatory character of the urban policies implemented 
in Jerusalem since 1967 by the israeli authorities. in the past these policies have 
always neglected and often harmed the Palestinian neighborhoods, so that nowadays 
they are characterized by conditions of acute urban decay, such as lack of services, the 
spread of precarious and unauthorized houses, and other problems.35 on the contrary, 
the plan declares the need to fix the problems of the Arab areas: for instance it declares 
the necessity to solve the problem of inadequate infrastructure and to meet the arab 
population’s enormous demand for residential building. 
it is worth underlining the fact that the plan also breaks a sort of taboo in israeli 
politics: it declares impracticable a demographic balance of 70:30 (Jews to arabs, 
respectively)36 and certifies that the most likely demographic scenario is a ratio of 
60:40 between Jews and arabs respectively. it is this latter scenario that the plan 
adopts as a basis for planning provision. 
Substantive Statements
at the level of general statements the master plan might appear to deal with the 
problems of both Jews and arabs in a “balanced way,” without any discrimination; 
nonetheless, an analysis of the substantive contents of the plan clearly reveals an 
unequal treatment of arabs and Jews. 
in general terms, the plan proposes two main strategies to guarantee new buildings: 
densification and expansion. In the first case, the addition of residential units within 
existing urbanized areas can be realized mainly through increasing the actual limits 
on height or volume; in the second case, the plan proposes the expansion of existing 
neighborhoods and the construction of new residential neighborhoods on the outskirts. 
these two strategies are managed differently depending on the population group 
involved: most of the proposed increase in Jewish building (62.4 percent) will take 
place through expansion; in contrast the proposed increase in residential building for 
the arab population through expansion is only 44.3 percent. 
Table 1. Residential expansion proposed by the Master Plan (nominal capacity)*. 
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, Local Outline Plan, chapter 4, 32-38).
 
Expansion
 (residential units number)
Densification 
(residential units number)
Jews 31,778 (62.4%) 19,131 (37.6%)
Arabs 14,462 (44.3%) 18,168 (55.7%)
(*) the master plan’s data concerning residential expansions are divided into nominal capacity and real 
capacity. real capacity refers to the share expected to be realized by 2020. in my analysis what is important 
is the nominal capacity: it concerns the overall building capacity allowed by the plan.
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the difference in treatment may 
also be related to a technical 
reason: the urban fabric of arab 
neighborhoods is sparser and has 
a lower density in comparison 
with Jewish neighborhoods and, 
thus, densification is more feasible 
in the former. however, this 
technical factor is probably not 
the main reason for the difference 
in treatment: that appears to 
be political. Densification and 
expansion are dissimilar in terms of 
territorial outcomes. Densification, 
unlike expansion, does not entail 
territorial occupation/consumption. 
So, from an israeli point of view, 
it is a very convenient strategy 
to provide arab housing without 
territorial enlargement of arab 
neighborhoods; on the other hand, 
expansion is a very convenient 
strategy to increase the housing 
supply for the Jewish population 
and at the same time to increase Jewish territorial occupation. 
the hypothesis of a politically oriented use of these techniques in relation to 
housing supply is confirmed by the fact that much of the Jewish residential increase is 
expected to be within East Jerusalem. in total, the Jerusalem master Plan allows more 
than 37,000 new residential units (by expansion or densification) within the occupied 
territories of East Jerusalem.37 For example, according to the plan, the Gilo and har 
homa neighborhoods, located in the southern part of East Jerusalem, are expected 
to double: they have an additional rated capacity of 7,808 units (6,548 through 
expansion) and 8,105 units (7,728 through expansion) respectively. the plan does 
not provide any estimates of the land area to be occupied by these new expansions. 
however an overall idea can be drawn from Figure 1, realized according to the maps 
contained in report no 4. 
With reference to arab neighborhoods, the additional building capacity proposed 
by the plan amounts to 32,630 new residential units. the majority of this capacity 
(55.7 percent) is to be carried out by densification; expansions relate to the 
enlargement of the Beit hanina, Jabel mukhbar and al Walaja neighborhoods. on 
paper, the building capacity proposed by the plan is quantitatively considerable: 
32,630 new units38 against existing property estimated (in 2004) at 38,226 units (this 
does not take into account the 15,000 unauthorized buildings). 
Figure 1: Jerusalem master Plan, residential expansions by 
population subgroup. Source: Author’s elaboration based on 
Jerusalem Municipality local outline Plan, chapter 4, 20.
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nevertheless, even if the provisions of the master plan will be fully implemented, 
by 2020, according to Souad nasr-makhoul,39 100,000 arab residents will lack 
housing. moreover, as i will argue in the following section, it is quite likely that these 
provisions will remain a paper proposal because of the many constraints concerning 
the realization of new buildings in arab neighborhoods. 
Opportunities of Residential Expansion
as is well known, all the contents of a plan are merely hypothetical: their 
implementation is related to many factors, largely independent of the plan itself. 
nevertheless, it is important to reflect on the chances that the contents of the 
Jerusalem master Plan have of being implemented.
With reference to Jewish neighborhoods, there is a good chance that the provisions 
of the plan will be fully implemented. this is suggested in part by the pace of 
expansion of Jewish building in East Jerusalem in the last decade (an expansion which 
has been always directly supported and promoted by the israeli authorities). there are 
no signs of a future change in this regard. it is also corroborated by the detailed plans 
that, according to daniel Seidemann,40 have been approved or submitted in the last few 
years. the approved detailed plans for 393 new houses at neve Ya’acov and for 2,337 
new houses at Givat hamatos C correspond to expansion areas in the master plan. this 
is also the case in relation to the detailed plans submitted for 105 new houses at ramot 
and 983 at har homa. 
on the contrary, if we compare the Jerusalem master Plan’s contents regarding 
arab neighborhoods with the status quo of East Jerusalem and with ordinary urban 
policies, the plan’s proposals for extra arab housing appear to be largely non-
achievable. this is particularly true if the problem of unauthorized buildings is 
taken into account.41 the master plan dedicates only a few lines to this subject.42 
it simply determines the number of unauthorized residential units in the arab 
areas (approximately 15,000, or 28 percent of the total), but it does not take into 
consideration their distribution, as if this does not matter. the result is that the 
provisions of the plan (in particular regarding the densification process) risk 
being unfeasible. the majority of the 15,000 unauthorized arab residential units 
are comprised of stories added to existing housing without a building permit; the 
densification proposed by the plan in the Arab areas has already occurred, although 
in an unauthorized manner. The spaces the plan devotes to densification are already 
occupied and have been for many years. the possible results of this situation 
are twofold: first, an ex post process of regularization on the basis of the plan’s 
proposals; and second, the interruption of many processes of densification proposed 
by the plan, with blame for this attributed to unauthorized building. Given the 
policies implemented in past years by the municipality (opposed to every kind of 
regularization, and mainly grounded on demolition43) and the failure of the plan to 
mention the necessity to implement any regularization process, the most probable 
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outcome seems to be the second. 
Generally speaking, the idea expressed by the Jerusalem master Plan is that 
unauthorized residential development has essentially both a political and economic 
nature, and that the solution should exclusively be the demolition of unauthorized 
housing. no more discussion is devoted to this matter. however, to describe the 
unauthorized building phenomenon as merely a problem of public order signifies a 
lack of awareness of the deeper reasons for this phenomenon. there are many causes 
of unauthorized building, but the main one is certainly connected with urban policies 
and bureaucratic mechanisms implemented by the israeli municipality itself.44 in 
particular, illegal housing construction is directly connected to the extreme difficulty, 
for an arab inhabitant, of obtaining a building permit.45 the reasons offered are 
quite different. For instance, it is not possible to obtain building permits in areas 
characterized by an infrastructure shortage: this is a characteristic of many arab 
neighborhoods, and the blame lies entirely with the israeli municipality. moreover, it 
is not possible to obtain any building permit within areas where no detailed plan has 
been approved: many arab districts are not provided with these kinds of plans and (as 
the master plan itself highlights) this is again a fault of the israeli municipal planning 
policy. in addition to that, there are also several problems connected with the land 
registration system or the very high cost of building permits. these problems have 
existed for many decades, but the israeli authorities never tackled them. to sum up, as 
nathan maron states, “illegal construction on such a massive scale does not indicate 
contempt for the rule of law, as the municipality would have it. … it indicates, rather, 
a profound failure on the part of the planning system itself.”46 
Essentially, if the ordinary urban policies of the israeli administration are not 
recognized as preventing arab building, and if any real solution is to be found to this 
problem, the destiny of Arab residential expansion and densification proposed by 
the master plan is to remain a paper exercise. if during the next ten years the level 
of permits issued remains the same as in past decades (about 100-150 per year), the 
building capacity of 26,462 housing units for arabs provided by 2020 will be reduced 
to at least one-fifth. 
it is worth emphasizing that not only do parts of the provisions related to arab 
areas risk remaining a paper exercise, but also that some of the contents of the 
Jerusalem master Plan appear “deceptive.” this is particularly evident when we 
consider the fact that the plan completely ignores the spatial impact of the wall.47 
the completion of the wall will completely alter Jerusalem’s urban conformation. 
it represents the most relevant transformation of the city since 1967.48 Very large 
swathes of West Bank territory, where a large number of the most important israeli 
settlements in the West Bank around Jerusalem are located,49 will be physically 
annexed to israel (and to Jerusalem). moreover (and this is the most relevant factor 
to our discussion) the wall will exclude several arab neighborhoods from Jerusalem. 
this is the case of Samiramis, Kafr aqab, Shu‘fat refugee camp, ras Khamis, 
dahiyat as Salam, and al Walaja (fig. 2).50 these neighborhoods are inhabited by 
almost 55,000 arab Jerusalemites. officially, these neighborhoods are still part of 
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Jerusalem (they are located within 
the municipal borders, although 
they are situated on the eastern 
side of the wall). in real terms, 
however, the wall’s construction 
has actually excluded these areas 
from Jerusalem and from the 
control of the israeli authorities. 
as Yakir Segev (who holds the 
“East Jerusalem portfolio” in the 
Jerusalem municipality) argues, 
“the Jerusalem municipality 
has no hand in managing these 
neighborhoods, and doesn’t 
have the power to address the 
difficult situation facing the 
55,000 people who live there. 
[…] [these neighborhoods] are 
outside the jurisdiction of the state, 
and certainly the municipality. 
For all practical purposes, they 
are [located in] ramallah.”51 
despite that, the plan does not take into account the territorial outcomes of the 
wall; it simply declares that this will create some “complicated situations” to be 
treated case by case.52 in consequence, the plan continues to include the residential 
additions expected within these areas in the total count of arab housing capacity in 
Jerusalem, as if living on the western side of the wall or on the eastern side makes 
no difference: at al Walaja, the plan allows one of the greatest new expansions 
intended for the arab population (2,400 new buildings); at Kafr akav it allows 
densifications for 1,120 housing units; at Shu‘fat densification for 975 units. the 
arab neighborhoods on the eastern side of the wall in Jerusalem are de facto 
excluded from Jerusalem; as a consequence it does not seem proper to consider the 
4,500 new housing units located here as part of the Jerusalem residential capacity. 
Similarly, many others statements about arab neighborhoods contained in the 
master plan seem to have a small probability of being carried out. For instance, the 
plan claims the necessity to “create tools (including governmental assistance) that 
will facilitate the establishment of neighborhoods by public building,”53 but public 
buildings in Jerusalem have almost always been devoted only to the Jewish population 
it states that “the unsatisfactory engineering infrastructure in the east part of the 
city requires allocation of resources in a huge scale,”54 but public budgets allocated 
for arab neighborhood facilities have always been very insufficient (meir margalit 
argues that “although Palestinian Jerusalemites constitute 33 percent of the city’s total 
population, the amount of the municipal budget invested in East Jerusalem ranges 
Figure 2: the wall in the Jerusalem area. Source: 
Author’s elaboration based on UN OCHA oPt , Barrier 
Update and Jerusalem Municipality, local outline Plan.
Jerusalem Quarterly 51  [ 15 ]
from 8.5 percent to 11.75 percent”).55  With regard to all these policies, there are no 
signs of a future change in the israeli authorities’ attitude.
Conclusion
analysis of the Jerusalem master Plan shows how, passing from “general statements” 
to “substantive contents,” and from the contents of the master plan to real 
opportunities for development, there is an increasing restriction of the development 
possibilities of arab neighborhoods. this development is as balanced and wide as is 
necessary to meet the present and future needs of the arab population in the statements 
of principle. it is rather unbalanced when we analyse the substantive contents of the 
plan. It is insufficient (and sometimes just rhetorical) in terms of real opportunities.
therefore, even if the plan tends to present itself as merely a technical tool (and 
at first sight it may even seem to be a progressive planning document able to meet 
the needs of arab Jerusalemites), deeper analysis of the feasibility of its contents 
shows the master plan for what it really is: a tool for encouraging Jewish settlement 
in the eastern part of the city, while it pays little attention to the real needs of the arab 
population.56  Consequently, the Jerusalem master Plan can be considered the most 
recent and comprehensive part of the israeli “Judaization” strategy. nonetheless, it 
presents some elements of discontinuity with regard to urban policies implemented by 
the israeli authorities in Jerusalem since 1967. For instance, it explicitly recognizes 
the need to solve the problem of inadequate infrastructure in arab neighborhoods 
and the need to meet the enormous demand for residential building by the arab 
population. moreover, probably for the first time in an official israeli document, the 
impracticability of a 70:30 Jewish-arab demographic balance is stated. it is not by 
chance that the plan has been strongly resisted by the israeli right wing. of course, as i 
have argued, all these statements have a rhetorical value beyond the substantive value 
and they will probably have little real effectiveness in modifying the practical situation 
with regard to arab neighborhoods. 
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